. If she goes to war instead, her payoff is
. It is easy to show that the former is strictly greater than the latter, and hence S cannot credibly reject any proposal (x, 1 − x) such that 
Proof of Proposition 1
First consider D's decisions. Given S's acceptance rule, D is strictly best off proposing x * = p+c S whenever he makes a proposal, as this is the best possible payoff he can effectively get in the model (given that S can choose to fight instead of accepting a worse offer, and if 
. The latter is strictly greater than the former, and hence S must be choosing to pass. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
First consider D's decisions. The same argument as above shows that D is strictly best off proposing x * = p+c S whenever he makes a proposal, given S's acceptance rule. Now consider a period in which S makes an offer. If she makes a low offer and D chooses to fight, his payoff
If he chooses to say no instead, we have just shown that his optimal continuation
(note that if D says no, S chooses to pass rather than fight). For the lower bound on δ D in this equilibrium, the latter is greater than the former, and hence D cannot credibly reject any offer (y, 1 − y) such that For the upper bound on δ D in this equilibrium, the former is greater than the latter, and hence D chooses to fight rather than pass. Now consider S's decisions. S cannot credibly reject any offer that gives her at least her utility from war, i.e., any offer (x, 1 − x) such that x ≤ p + c S . This is because D chooses to fight if S says no to his offer. If S gets a worse offer, she is indifferent between fighting and saying no (since in the latter case D fights anyway), and hence can be doing either, or mixing. Now suppose D has said no to S's offer. We have just shown that S's continuation value for
. This is strictly greater than her payoff
for fighting, and hence S must be passing rather than fighting. Now consider periods in which S makes an offer. Given D's acceptance rule, the best possible (for herself) acceptable agreement that S can propose in the current period is y *
, for a total payoff of
. Setting this greater than her payoff for proposing a lower y that is rejected and leads to agreement being reached in the next period,
, and simplifying, we obtain 
Proof of Proposition 3
Note that in this proof, we use the "one-stage-deviation principle," henceforth OSDP, for infinite horizon games with discounting of future payoffs (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, 108-110 ). This principle states that, to verify that a profile of strategies comprises a SPE, one just has to verify that, given the other players' strategies, no player can improve her payoff at any history at which it is her turn to move by deviating from her equilibrium strategy at that history and then reverting to her equilibrium strategy afterwards.
We want to look for a SPE in which D is mixing between passing and fighting, at any decision node at which S has said no to D's offer.
1
Suppose that in this (supposed) SPE, D's average per-period payoff for the subgame beginning in the next period (in which S makes an offer) is y . Then, for mixing to be okay, it must be the case that D is indifferent between fighting and passing, i.e., 
If he proposes some bigger x, S says no and D's expected payoff (if he then uses his equilibrium strategy for the rest of the game) is β( (note that S's strategy is to pass if D says no, and so the next period will be reached). Setting the latter strictly greater than the former and simplifying, we obtain q < p − c D , which is true. Therefore, D is strictly better off saying no rather than fighting, if S's offer is too small. Therefore, he cannot do any better (assuming that he uses his equilibrium strategy in the future) than use the acceptance rule of accepting any offer (y, 1 − y) such that
, and say no (rather than fight)
if he gets a lower offer.
2
We have thus verified that D's strategy satisfies the OSDP, i.e., there exists no history at which D can profitably deviate from his equilibrium strategy at that stage and then revert back to his equilibrium strategy. Now we have to verify that the same is true for S.
Suppose D has just said no to S's offer. If S fights, her payoff is
. If she passes instead and follows her equilibrium strategy in the future, her payoff is
Setting the latter strictly greater than the former and simplifying, we obtain δ
which is implied by our restriction in this proposition that δ
, and hence S's strategy satisfies the OSDP at this stage.
Now consider periods in which S makes a proposal. Given D's acceptance rule, the most favorable (for herself) acceptable agreement that S can propose is y *
leaving her with an overall payoff of , and then reverting to her equilibrium strategy, although the latter point is moot because the agreement will be accepted and the game will end.) Therefore, we have verified that S's strategy satisfies the OSDP at histories at which she makes a proposal.
2 Note that the only acceptance rule which is as good as this one for any offer by S, i.e., at any history at which S has just made an offer to D, is to accept any proposal (y, 1 − y) such that y >
, and say no (rather than fight) if he gets a lower offer.
Finally, we need to verify that S's acceptance rule satisfies the OSDP. We consider the three cases in turn.
Consider a period in which D makes an offer. According to S and D's equilibrium strategies, in the next period, agreement would be reached on y * (since δ S > δ D ). Therefore, in the current period, S's continuation value for saying no (if she uses her equilibrium strategy in the future) is β[
]. If she fights instead, her payoff is
Setting the former strictly greater than the latter and simplifying, we obtain
. Therefore, S is strictly better off saying no rather than fighting, if she gets a low offer. Therefore, she cannot do any better (assuming she uses her equilibrium strategy in the future) than use the acceptance rule of accepting any offer (x, 1 − x) such that
, and say no (rather than fight) if she gets a worse offer. Setting this equivalent to the acceptance rule described in the statement of the proposition (namely,
and solving for β, we obtain β =
. That is, when β takes on this value, S's acceptance rule as described in the proposition satisfies the OSDP at any history at which D has just made an offer to S. Note that β → 1 (from below) as
(from above). That is, this equilibrium converges to that of Proposition 2. Also note that our requirement in this proposition that δ
Consider a period in which D makes an offer. According to S and D's equilibrium strategies, in the next period, S will propose some y < y * , which D rejects, and agreement will be reached on x * in the following period. Therefore, in the current period, S's continuation value for saying no (if she uses her equilibrium strategy in the future) is β[
. Setting the former strictly greater than the latter and simplifying, we obtain δ
, which is implied by our restriction in this proposition that δ
and say no (rather than fight) if she gets a worse offer. Setting this equivalent to the acceptance rule described in the statement of the proposition and solving for β, we obtain
(from above). That is, this equilibrium converges to that of Proposition 2. Also note that 
. Setting the former strictly greater than the latter and simplifying, we obtain c S + c D > 0, which is true. Therefore, S is strictly better off saying no rather than fighting, if she gets a low offer. Therefore, she cannot do any better (assuming she uses her equilibrium strategy in the future) than use the acceptance rule of accepting any offer (x, 1 − x) such that
, and say no (rather than fight) if she gets a worse offer.
Setting this equivalent to the acceptance rule described in the statement of the proposition and solving for β, we obtain β =
(from above), and hence this equilibrium converges to that of Proposition 2.
Also note that β → 0 (from above) as δ → 1 (from below).
Therefore, we have verified that D and S's strategies satisfy the OSDP at any history at which it is their turn to move. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
The SPE characterized in Proposition 3 are stationary, except that when δ S ≤ δ D , S can be choosing different actions (among which she is indifferent) at different histories (but that lead to structurally identical subgames) at which it is her turn to make an offer, and this allows for non-stationarity (but D and S's payoffs are the same in all of these SPE).
It turns out that when δ D is high, there are also SPE that are non-stationary in a more genuine sense. Suppose that δ In fact, we can suppose that in the last decision node of the first period, D fights with some probability λ and passes with probability 1 − λ. When λ = 1, we are in the SPE described above, and when λ = β, we are in the stationary SPE of Proposition 3. As λ decreases, D's proposal for himself in the first period, x * , decreases. When δ S ≥ δ D (so that agreement will be reached on y *
in the second period -see Proposition 3), then in the first period, S accepts all agreements (x, 1 − x) such that
, and says no (rather than fight) for any worse offer.
This can be simplified to obtain that in the first period, S accepts all offers (x, 1 − x) 
Proof of Proposition 5
We want to construct a PBE in which neither type of D rejects S's initial offer in order to make a counteroffer. Each type accepts all initial offers (y, 1 − y) such that y is at least as great as its expected utility from war, and fights (rather than says no) if it gets a lower offer.
We also want that if the second period is reached (this is off-the-equilibrium path behavior), the strategies of the players are such that agreement is reached on x * = p + c S , i.e., D gets all of the gains from avoiding war. First note that if such an agreement were to be reached, then S would be strictly best off passing rather than fighting if D says no to S's initial offer,
i.e.,
. Then, for type c D l to be fighting rather than saying no if he gets a low initial offer, it must be that
. This also ensures that type c D l cannot credibly reject any initial offer (y, 1 − y) such that
Similarly, for type c D h 's acceptance rule to be to accept any initial offer (y, 1 − y) such that y ≥ p−c D h and go to war (rather than say no) for a lower y, it must be that 
Proof of Proposition 6
This equilibrium is similar to the previous one in that, if the second period is reached, agreement is reached on x * = p+c S . However, because we have stipulated in this proposition
, in the first period, if type c D h gets a low initial offer, he prefers to move to the second period and get x * rather than fight. Thus, his acceptance rule in the first period must be to accept any offer (y, 1−y) such that
and say no (rather than fight) for any lower y. Because we have stipulated in this proposition If the second period is reached, we stipulate that S believes with certainty that she is facing type c D h , and this belief never changes. (If the second period is reached on-theequilibrium path, this belief follows from Bayes' rule, and if it is reached off-the-equilibrium path, we as the analyst stipulate that this is S's belief, since Bayes' rule does not apply.
This off-the-equilibrium path belief is quite reasonable, because type c D h 's payoff from war is lower and hence he is more likely to say no rather than go to war than type c D l .) Since we have stipulated in this proposition that
, the conditions for 
∈ [0, 1).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7
We want to construct a risk-return tradeoff equilibrium even when δ D is high. 
, which we therefore stipulate to hold in this proposition. Therefore, we know from the proof of Proposition 3 that type c D h 's acceptance rule in the first period is optimal, given that he expects agreement to be 
, then c D l prefers S's initial offer is too small. The natural way to do this is to use the results of Proposition 2, in which agreement is reached on x * = p + c S whenever D makes a proposal, and D says no rather than fights, if S makes a small offer. The stipulation in this proposition that
means that the conditions of Proposition 2 hold for both types of D, i.e., it means that
. Thus, we simply specify that, beginning from the very first period and continuing forever after, both types of D use the strategy of Proposition 2. Note that this strategy does not depend on D's cost of war in any way, and hence both types are adopting identical strategies. Since they are adopting identical strategies, S's best response is to adopt the strategy of Proposition 2, regardless of the value of s. And, given that S is adopting the strategy of Proposition 2, the best response of both types of D is to use the strategy of Proposition 2.
If the second period is reached on-the-equilibrium path, S's belief will remain at s, by Bayes' rule. If it is reached off-the-equilibrium path, then we specify that S's belief can be anything, and that S as well as both types of D continue to use the strategies of Proposition 2. If the third period is reached (this can only happen off-the-equilibrium path, since both types of D fight if S rejects D's offer in the second period), then the belief can be anything, and everyone continues to use the strategies of Proposition 2, and so on. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9
We want to construct a PBE in which both type of D make counteroffers rather than fight, if S's initial offer is too small, and in which δ D can be very high. Because we want to allow δ D to be high, we use the results of Proposition 3. In particular, we stipulate that if the third period is reached (it will turn out that this can only happen off-the-equilibrium path), then S believes with certainty that she is facing type c D h (which, as we have been discussing earlier, is a sensible belief), and this belief never changes. Thus, we stipulate that, beginning in the , which we therefore stipulate to hold in this proposition, and hence c D l 's acceptance rule in the first period is fine. The last thing to note is that if D says no to S's initial offer, S is strictly better of passing rather than fighting, since she expects agreement to be reached on x * in the next period. Q.E.D.
